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ADULTERY AS TORT*
LANCE MCMILLIAN*
North Carolina is one of the last remaining states to recognize
tort claims arising from adultery. Ignoring criticism of this
position, the appellate courts of the state have consistently and
steadfastly refused to abandon adultery-based actions, despite
many high-profile opportunities to do so. Traditional torts such
as alienation of affections and criminal conversation thus retain
their viability. Not everyone is pleased with North Carolina's
isolation in this regard. Attempts in the North Carolina
legislature to repeal these perceived legal relics have increasingly
gained traction in recent years. With the future of these torts in
North Carolina in doubt, the time is ripe to assess whether any
compelling reasons exist to preserve them.
In this vein, this Article offers a countercultural defense of North
Carolina's continuing embrace of adultery as tort. First, as the
ongoing debate over gay marriage demonstrates, citizens of all
political stripes look to government to validate marriage as an
institution. Gay marriage advocates see state licensing as an
essential step in elevating the status of same-sex couples. Gay
marriage opponents, on the other hand, look to the state as the
decisive authority for protecting the traditional view of marriage
as being between one man and one woman. But if the state is the
proper vehicle for legitimizing the marriage bond, as all sides
seem to agree, then it follows that the state should have a
prominent role in protecting that bond. Second, the tort system
presently offers robust protection to victims injured when their
business or contractual relationships suffer sabotage from third-
party tortious interference. Marriage, as a relationship of
demonstrably greater importance, deserves the same level of legal
respect. Third, through loss of consortium claims, the law
already offers strong protection of the marital bed against
intrusions by third-party tortfeasors. The ubiquity of loss of
consortium claims shows both tort law's desire to protect
marriage from the actions of third parties and its willingness to
* © 2012 Lance McMillian.
** Associate Professor, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. B.A., University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., University of Georgia School of Law.
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intrude into the most private of personal details to effectuate this
desire.
By contrasting adultery as tort with these other areas of legal
interest, I hope to demonstrate that adultery-based torts are not
as far out of the legal mainstream as is commonly assumed,
perhaps paving the way for a wider acceptance of claims such as
alienation of affections once again.
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INTRODUCTION
American Idol winner Fantasia Barrino made an unwelcome
return to the headlines in August 2010 when court documents alleged
that she engaged in "illicit sexual behavior" with Antwaun Cook, a
married man.' Celebrity sex scandals, of course, are nothing new,
1. See Complaint for Child Custody, Child Support, Postseparation Support,
Alimony, Equitable Distribution, and Attorney's Fees at 1, 5, Cook v. Cook, No. 10-CVD-
16371 (N.C. Dist. Ct. Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://media.syracuse.com/entertainment/
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especially ones that involve allegations of adultery. Yet Fantasia's
liaison with a married man had a distinguishing characteristic that
separated it from the typical Hollywood scandal of the week. The
wrinkle: Fantasia's indiscretions occurred in the State of North
Carolina.
Traditionally, through the "heartbalm" torts, the common law
took active measures to protect the sanctity of marriage from third-
party interference.2 Comprised of four separate causes of action,
these torts covered a range of conduct deemed harmful to both
present and prospective marriage relationships:
(1) alienation of affections (a third party causes estrangement
between spouses); (2) criminal conversation (a third party's
adulterous relationship with a plaintiff's wife, usually); (3)
seduction (an unmarried woman's father and the woman herself
could make a claim for injury resulting from premarital sex or
unwed motherhood); and (4) breach of marriage promise (a
promise of future marriage induced a woman to engage in
sexual behavior that she would not have but for the promise
and expectation of marriage).3
Courts, legal scholars, and state legislatures have long
contemplated whether tort law should continue to play this marriage-
regulating role.4 The general consensus that emerged beginning in the
other/Fantasia+documents.pdf. Fantasia later admitted to the affair when questioned
about it under oath. See Shirea L. Carroll, Fantasia Admits to Terminating Cook's Baby,
ESSENCE (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.essence.com/2010/11/29/fantasias-courtroom-
shocker/.
2. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79
U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 251 n.265 (2010) (citations omitted) (arguing heartbalm torts are not
a proper means of protecting marriage).
3. Id.
4. See Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. REV.
979, 979 (1935) ("[T]he social cost of such protection by means of an action for damages
may exceed its worth."). See generally Frederick L. Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy, 5
FORDHAM L. REV. 63 (1936) (examining New York legislation that abolished remedies
for heartbalm torts); Note, Avoidance of the Incidence of the Anti-Heartbalm Statutes, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1952) (critiquing the theory that anti-heartbalm statutes could be
easily avoided by use of other tort remedies, and concluding that "[o]n the whole,
forecasts that anti-heartbalm legislation would be easily subverted have not been
realized"); William M. Kelly, Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for
Intentional Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 426 (1972)
(analyzing the policies behind heartbalm torts, and suggesting "the revitalization of the
body of tort law dealing with intentional interference with the marital relationship");
Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583 (1998) (analyzing the
inconsistencies between anti-heartbalm laws and the common law's approach to broken
engagements).
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1930s is no.5 The result is that adultery-based claims such as
alienation of affections and criminal conversation face near extinction
across the country.6 One court captures the prevailing mood by
noting that these torts "have outlived any usefulness they may have
possessed" once upon a time.7 This feeling is widespread, as all but
seven states have joined this abolition movement.8
Unfortunately for Fantasia, North Carolina stands as one of
these last remaining holdouts.9  Despite many high-profile
opportunities to do so, the appellate courts of the state have
consistently and steadfastly refused to abandon the adultery-centered
torts. 10 Perhaps the most famous case involves wronged wife Dorothy
Hutelmyer, whose story made national news-and eventually became
a Lifetime movie-when a jury awarded her one million dollars
against her husband's former secretary for alienation of affections
and criminal conversation.11 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
5. See Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 359, 406-430 (2008)
(describing history of opposition to heartbalm torts).
6. Id.
7. Russo v. Sutton, 422 S.E.2d 750, 753 (S.C. 1992).
8. See Fitch v. Valentine, 2005-CA-01800-SCT (1 15) (Miss. 2007) (noting that as
recently as 2007, Mississippi, Illinois, Hawaii, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah were the only states to recognize these torts).
9. See Graham, supra note 5, at 430.
10. One notable exception to this steadfast support is the case of Cannon v. Miller, 71
N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985), in
which the Court of Appeals of North Carolina tried to abolish the torts of alienation of
affections and criminal conversation. Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 804. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina summarily reversed this ruling in a direct and concise manner:
It appearing that the panel of Judges of the Court of Appeals to which this case
was assigned has acted under a misapprehension of its authority to overrule
decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and its responsibility to follow
those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court. It is therefore
ordered that the petition for discretionary review is allowed for the sole purpose of
vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals purporting to abolish the causes of
action for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation.
Cannon, 313 N.C. at 324, 327 S.E.2d at 888.
11. See, e.g., Lloyd Ferriss, House Cleaners Want Sun to Set on Archaic Laws
Forbidding the Burning of Bricks and Requiring the Whitewashing of Jails Are Among the
Laws Whose Time Has Come and Gone, The Group Says, ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Aug.
31, 1997, at 1B, available at NewsBank, File No. 9708310386 (noting that the Hutelmyer
"case has become the subject of talk show hosts from Oprah Winfrey to Ricki Lake"); see
also The Price of a Broken Heart (Lifetime television broadcast Aug. 16, 1999). The
verdict was an unpopular one in legal circles. See Terry Carter, 'She Done Me Wrong:' A
Jury Agrees, Awarding a Jilted Wife $1 Million in an Alienation of Affection Suit Against
the 'Other Woman,' A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 24 (explaining the difficulty of finding any
legal expert to defend the verdict and the law that supported it).
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subsequently affirmed the jury's work. 12 Hutelmyer's success is not
unique, as Anne Lundquist-like Fantasia, the proverbial "other
woman"-learned to her chagrin in 2010.13 When Cynthia
Shackelford sued Lundquist for breaking up her thirty-three-year
marriage, the jury hit Lundquist with a crushing $9 million verdict,
including $4 million in punitive damages.14 There have been several
other seven-figure results, although the majority of awards are of
much smaller amounts.1 5 One attorney estimated that overall, North
Carolina sees approximately 200 new alienation of affections cases
each year. 6 Even though the heartbalm torts technically remain on
the books in six other states, "North Carolina is just about the only
bright spot for these claims."1 7
Not everyone is pleased with North Carolina's ongoing isolation
and notoriety in continuing to embrace these torts. As one divorce
lawyer reportedly observed: "There's often bad conduct. Adultery is
not uncommon, but an alienation-of-affection case just polarizes
everyone and devastates everything in its path including the children
and both spouses .... ,"18 Because of this and similar opposition,
unsuccessful attempts in the North Carolina legislature to statutorily
repeal these perceived legal relics were, until recently, an annual
12. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 366, 514 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1999).
13. See Alice Gomstyn, Wife Wins $9 Million from Husband's Alleged Mistress, ABC
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wife-wins-million-husbands-
alleged-mistress/story?id=10151957&singlePage=true. Interestingly, Allan Shackelford,
the third party of this love triangle, came to his mistress's defense by arguing that
Lundquist could not be the cause of the deterioration of his relationship with his wife since
"he had had numerous affairs going back to the first two years" of his thirty-three-year
marriage. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id.
15. See G. Edgar Parker, Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation, FAM. F.
(N.C. Bar Ass'n Family Law Section) Mar. 2, 2011, at 11, 12, available at
http://familylaw.ncbar.org/media/11481991/flmar1l.pdf (describing North Carolina
verdicts of $1.1 million and $1.41 million and noting that most verdicts have ranged from
$60,000 to a nominal amount); Fred Taylor, Divorce Lawyers Want Alienation-of-
Affection Law Dropped, WRAL.COM (Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.wral.com/news/local/
story/105127/ (describing $2 million verdict awarded to Christine Cooper in 2001); Paul
Thompson, Spurned Wife Sues Her Husband's Mistress - and WINS $5.8million [sic],
MAILONLINE.COM, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1310322/Spurned-wife-Lynn-
Arcara-sues-husbands-mistress-WINS-3-75m.html (last updated Sept. 9, 2010, 7:47 AM)
(describing Chapel Hill case of Dr. Lynn Arcara against Susan Pecoraro).
16. See Gomstyn, supra note 13. The basis for this attorney's estimate is unclear.
17. Graham, supra note 5, at 430 (also describing North Carolina as "virtually the only
place in which heartbalm suits (most often, alienation of affections claims) could be
described as common enough to have developed a substantial body of modern case law").
18. Taylor, supra note 15.
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tradition.19 In 2009, however, both the House and Senate passed for
the first time legislation, entitled "Procedures in causes of action for
alienation of affection and criminal conversation," recognizing the
existence of the adultery-based torts:
(a) No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action
for alienation of affection or criminal conversation that occurs
after the plaintiff and the plaintiff's spouse physically separate
with the intent of either the plaintiff or plaintiff's spouse that
the physical separation remain permanent.
(b) An action for alienation of affection or criminal
conversation shall not be commenced more than three years
from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of
action.
(c) A person may commence a cause of action for alienation of
affection or criminal conversation against a natural person
only.2"
Because the new law places restrictions on when civil liability
shall arise, one observer of the adultery-centered torts sees this
legislation as the first step in the long-anticipated repeal of these
laws.21 Supporters of these claims, on the other hand, see section 52-
13 as both offering explicit statutory validation that these torts remain
viable and adding modest language that "merely cleared up a few
issues that many practitioners, whether representing Plaintiffs or
Defendants, had struggled with in prosecuting and defending against
these actions over the years."22 Whatever the ultimate signal intended
by the new law's passage, it seems fair to say that North Carolina's
singularity as "the only bright spot" for adultery-focused torts means
that the continued existence of such claims will likely continue to rest
on shifting ground. With the future of these torts at continued risk,
and with recent high-profile cases once again placing North
Carolina's unique stance in the national consciousness, the time is
ripe to assess whether any compelling reasons exist to preserve them.
19. See Caroline L. Batchelor, Comment, Falling Out of Love with an Outdated Tort:
An Argument for the Abolition of Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1910, 1924-25 (2009) (discussing failed legislative attempts); Parker, supra note 15,
at 11 (describing annual ritual).
20. Act of Aug. 3, 2009, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 780, 780 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-13 (2011).
21. See Batchelor, supra note 19, at 1925 (describing legislation as "significantly
limit[ing] actions in criminal conversation and alienation of affection").
22. Parker, supra note 15, at 11.
1992 [Vol. 90
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In this vein, this Article offers a countercultural defense of North
Carolina's continuing embrace of tort claims arising from adultery.
Three components comprise this defense. First, as the ongoing debate
over gay marriage demonstrates, citizens of all political stripes look to
government to validate marriage as an institution. Gay marriage
advocates see state licensing as an essential step in elevating the
status of same-sex couples.2 3 Gay marriage opponents, on the other
hand, look to the state as the decisive authority for protecting the
traditional view of marriage as being between one man and one
woman.24 But if the state is the proper vehicle for legitimizing the
marriage bond, as all sides seem to agree, then it follows that the state
should have a prominent role in protecting that bond.
Second, the tort system presently offers a robust remedy to
victims injured when their business or contractual relationships suffer
sabotage from third-party tortious interference.25 The reasons behind
these torts center on the important role contracts play in the
functioning of a well-ordered society. Marriage, as a relationship of
demonstrably greater importance, deserves the same level of legal
respect and protection. The message to third parties sent by both
economic and matrimonial anti-interference torts is substantially the
same: "Stay away." While a claim such as alienation of affections may
not be perfect, it nevertheless furthers the function of tort law by
23. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 928 (2001) ("Civil marriage is
a unique symbolic or expressive resource, usable to communicate a variety of messages to
one's spouse and others, and thereby to facilitate people's constitution of personal
identity.").
24. See An Argument Against Same-Sex Marriage: An Interview with Rick Santorum,
THE PEW F. ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Apr. 24, 2008), http://pewforum.org/Gay-
Marriage-and-Homosexuality/An-Argument-Against-Same-Sex-Marriage-An-Interview-
with-Rick-Santorum.aspx. In this interview, former Senator Rick Santorum explicitly
articulates the idea that it is the role of the state through the force of law to give voice to
moral values:
[T]he laws in this country are built upon a certain worldview, and it is the Judeo-
Christian worldview. And that worldview has been expressed in our laws on
marriage for 200-plus years. Up until 25 years ago, we would never have sat here
and done this interview. It would have been beyond the pale. And so it is clearly a
dramatic departure from the Judeo-Christian ethic that is reflected in our laws that
say marriage is a sacred union between a man and a woman.
Id.
25. See John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference with Contract: A Reassertion of
Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1491, 1491 (1981).
2012] 1993
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guarding that which is valuable from those who intentionally seek to
destroy that value for their own selfish ends.
Third, through loss of consortium claims, the law already offers
strong protection of the marital bed against intrusions by third-party
tortfeasors. These claims, which compensate for a "loss of the benefits
that one spouse is entitled to receive from the other, including
companionship, cooperation, aid, affection, and sexual relations, 26
often turn on many of the same issues as heartbalm cases-such as
the state of the parties' marriage prior to the tortious conduct, the
sexual intimacies of the marriage, and the causal link between the
tortious conduct and the state of the parties' marriage post-injury. 7
The ubiquity of loss of consortium claims shows both tort law's desire
to protect marriage from the actions of third parties and its
willingness to intrude into the most private of personal details to
effectuate this desire. These twin impulses generate little, if any,
objection from courts and scholars as loss of consortium is a common,
non-controversial part of American tort law. 8 The same impulses,
however, generate "scorn" when analyzed in the context of the
heartbalm torts.29 By highlighting this dichotomy in treatment, this
Article attempts to demonstrate that adultery-based torts are not as
far out of the legal mainstream as is commonly assumed, perhaps
paving the way for a wider acceptance of claims such as alienation of
affections once again.
Part I of this Article details the bill of particulars scholars and
courts have lodged against the heartbalm torts for nearly a century.
Understanding the historical distrust shown to claims such as
alienation of affections provides a useful foundation for looking at the
utility of the heartbalm torts with fresh eyes. I argue that the original
grounds for jettisoning the adultery torts no longer retain their initial
force. Part II continues the argument raised in the previous three
paragraphs by relying on the gay marriage debate, the similarities
between tortious interference with commercial relationships and
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (9th ed. 2009).
27. See, e.g., Michael Sanders, How Much Is Your Marriage Worth?, THE EYE
OPENER (June 10, 2011), http://medicalmalpracticeblog.nashandassociates.com/2011/
06/10ihow-much-is-your-marriage-worth (providing examples of questions asked in
connection with loss of consortium claims).
28. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 486 (3d ed. 2010)
(describing loss of consortium claims as "[a] well-established item of tort damages").
29. See Sherry Honeycutt Everett, Recent Development, The Law of Alienation of
Affections After McCutchen v. McCutchen: In North Carolina, Breaking Up Just Got
Harder to Do, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1761, 1762 (2007) ("Alienation of affections claims have
generated scorn from judges, legislators, and academics virtually since their inception.").
[Vol. 901994
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alienation of affection claims, and the law's treatment of loss of
consortium claims. This reasoning-by-analogy approach contends that
the premises supporting the current approach to gay marriage,
tortious interference, and loss of consortium supports North
Carolina's continuing willingness to provide tort relief to spouses
injured by the actions of ill-motivated third parties. In particular, the
law's interest in defending marriage, protecting relationships from
outside interference, and compensating spouses for the tortious loss
of marital benefits aligns squarely with the purposes behind allowing
claims for alienation of affections. The closeness between these other
areas of law and alienation of affections demonstrates that tort
remedies are properly employed as adultery-remedying tools.
Part III proposes modest changes to North Carolina law
designed to address some of the valid concerns others have raised
about the operation of heartbalm claims in practice. Most
significantly, I advocate for the abolition of the tort of criminal
conversation. Unlike alienation of affections claims, criminal
conversation does not rest on a showing of a preexisting happy
marriage or third-party wrongdoing.3" The absence of these elements
increases the possibility of imposing liability in circumstances where
tort liability is not warranted. For reasons such as this, I argue that
the continuing existence of alienation of affections claims in North
Carolina renders criminal conversation counterproductive and
unnecessary. Finally, in the Conclusion, I return to the Fantasia
imbroglio that began the Article. Assuming the factual issue of
whether the Cooks had a good marriage pre-Fantasia, the case of
Fantasia seemingly presents a textbook example of the very conduct
that adultery-based torts seek to deter-that of a rich, famous, and
attractive third party seducing an otherwise happy spouse away from
the marriage bed.3' But in the twenty-first century, can a third party
30. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 2, at 251 n.265 (describing alienation of affections
and criminal conversation).
31. Fantasia is not the only example of alleged celebrity involvement in the break-up
of a non-celebrity marriage. Jerry Seinfeld began dating future wife Jessica Sklar in
August 2008, approximately one month after she returned from a two-week honeymoon
with her new husband Eric Nederlander. See Allen Salkin, How I Met Jerry Seinfeld, Scene
1, Take 2, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at I1; see also Shannon Donnelly,
Weddings/Celebrations: Vows; Lindsey Kupferman and Eric Nederlander, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2004, at ST21 (including Nederlander's description of the break-up of his first
marriage as "extremely difficult" and "not something you forget easily, if you ever do").
Not surprisingly, Sklar and Nederlander's accounts of the end of their marriage differed
considerably. Sklar claimed that two days after returning from her honeymoon with
Nederlander, she began moving possessions out of their apartment because the marriage
was already over; Nederlander countered that Sklar was "trying to make the past look like
20121 1995
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like Fantasia truly be said to be the legal cause of alienating the
affections between husband and wife? This paper concludes that,
when analyzed in the context of tort law as a whole, the answer is yes.
I. THE CASE AGAINST ADULTERY AS TORT
The law represents a means for society to express its collective
disapproval toward conduct deemed worthy of reprobation. 32 And
American society, even at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
continues to agree: adultery is bad.33 Given this low standing that
adultery occupies in the public consciousness, it would seem
it never existed ... so people don't look at her anymore as a bad person." Salkin, supra.
Similarly, Julia Roberts began dating future husband and cameraman Daniel Moder on
the set of the movie The Mexican. At the time, Moder was married to Vera Steinberg and
reportedly left his wife to be with Roberts. See Stephen M. Silverman, Julia: A 'Smiling,'
'Beautiful' Bride, PEOPLE (July 8, 2002), http://www.people.com/people/article/
0,,624299,00.html. The celebrity angle is particularly interesting because such relationships
contain the allure of a fairy tale that contrasts very favorably-if not accurately-with the
sometimes mundane realities of family life.
32. Although "[c]riminal law is often viewed as the ideal space in which the state
expresses the social norms it seeks to promote and conveys that the norms are public
values," it remains the case that tort law "can also be crafted as a venue for the state to use
the expressive function of the law." Tanya Katerf Hernindez, Hate Speech and the
Language of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech
Restrictions and Legislation Models, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 805, 839 (2011); see Cass R.
Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1994) (noting that
"widespread moral disapproval is not always a legitimate basis for law" and the need to
differentiate between "contexts in which moral disapproval is legitimate from those in
which it is not").
33. See Eric Widmer, Judith Treas & Robert Newcomb, Attitudes Toward Nonmarital
Sex in 24 Countries, 35 J. SEX RES. 349, 354 (1998). Indeed, the United States, perhaps
because of its rate of church attendance, views non-marital sex much more negatively than
most of its European peers:
The United States is distinctive-markedly more conservative than most
European nations in its sexual attitudes. In fact, American attitudes toward
nonmarital sex class it with Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Poland-three nations
associated with conservative Catholic populations. Other nominally Catholic
countries (e.g., Italy) do not fall in to this cluster, so the common denominator of
the Sexual Conservatives is not religion per se. An analysis of ... data on church
attendance, however, does show that the countries grouped as Sexual
Conservatives are those where people report attending church frequently.
See id. at 356. In response to specific questions about adultery, 94% of Americans
answered that adultery is "always wrong" or "almost always wrong" (80% and 14%,
respectively). See id. at 351. Church attendance itself cannot entirely account for the
almost universal disapproval of adultery, as only roughly 42% of Americans regularly
attend church. See Frank Newport, Americans' Church Attendance Inches Up in 2010,
GALLUP.COM (June 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141044/americans-church-
attendance-inches-2010.aspx. Rather, there appears to be something ingrained in the
American character that rejects the idea of adultery as morally or socially acceptable.
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appropriate for tort law to reflect society's values by holding to
account third parties who invade the marital relationship and commit
adultery with someone else's spouse. Except in North Carolina and a
few other states, however, this is not the case. Professor William
Corbett captures this perplexity when he asks a series of questions
about the demise of the heartbalm torts:
What has changed in American law and American society that
has caused the eradication of these torts? Is adultery no longer
considered a devastating injury to a spouse? Do social mores
and public policy no longer support attempting to prevent
people from interfering with exclusive sexual relations in
marriage? Are the torts simply ineffective to redress the injury
or effect the public policy?34
The majority view would answer, "all this and more." Writing in
1935, when the first wave of anti-heartbalm feeling began in earnest
in state legislatures across the country,35 Professor Nathan Feinsinger
described the array of reasons-both stated and unstated-that led
many states to conclude that the heartbalm torts were simply not
worth the effort:
The surface explanation of this unusual legislative receptivity is
a reaction against the prevalence of blackmail peculiar to these
actions, the incongruity of applying the damage remedy to
injured feelings, and the perversion of that remedy by courts
and juries to express their emotional sympathy and moral
indignation. The underlying explanation is probably a
realization of the failure of these actions to accomplish their
original social purposes, and their non-conformity with changed
mores concerns sex morality, the status of women, and the
functions of the family. While the importance of the affectional
relations of husband and wife may still justify their legal
34. William Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for A New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 999 (2001)
(footnote omitted).
35. The death of the heartbalm torts in the United States occurred in two waves: one
in the 1930s, when many states responded to a perceived litigation explosion in heartbalm
cases by barring the claims legislatively, and the other in the late 1960s and beyond, when
the rise of the women's movement and the sexual revolution spurred legislatures and
courts to remove whatever remaining viability the torts still retained. See Graham, supra
note 5, at 406-30 (providing a detailed timeline of how and when the heartbalm torts were
eliminated). By the 1970s, "a near-consensus emerged that [heartbalm] claims were
somehow categorically deficient-that is, that the torts implicated no injury that was
properly compensable in tort, served no deterrence function, or were completely out of
tune with modern values." Id. at 428 (emphasis omitted).
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protection, the social cost of such protection by means of an
action for damages may exceed its worth.36
Feinsinger's list of reasons demonstrates the comprehensive
nature of the case against the heartbalm torts. It also shows that
perhaps the answer to many of Corbett's questions is yes; perhaps
adultery does not carry the devastating sting it once did, perhaps it is
the case that society does not blame adultery on third-party
interference but instead on the cheating spouse, and perhaps these
torts are in fact poorly constructed.
My task here is to analyze the critiques of Feinsinger and others
from the perspective of the twenty-first century. Even if these
concerns were valid once upon a time, it does not follow that they still
possess the same force today. Analyzing adultery as tort with fresh
eyes and an open mind, including the reasons typically offered for its
demise, paves the way for its rehabilitation. I begin with the torts'
disreputable genesis.
A. Ignoble Origins
One of the chief criticisms against the heartbalm torts is their
admittedly sexist beginnings as a means to compensate men for
damage to their property: their wives.37 In 1997, a North Carolina jury
awarded Dorothy Hutelmyer one million dollars against a third party
who destroyed her marriage. As the torts of alienation of affections
and criminal conversation were originally conceived, however,
Hutelmyer's claim would never have seen the inside of courtroom
simply because she was a woman. Even though this gender inequality
has long since been abolished,38 the original basis for the heartbalm
torts as a whole is enough for many to continue to conceptually
36. Feinsinger, supra note 4, at 979. Feinsinger uses "heartbalm" to describe all four
traditional torts under the heartbalm umbrella: breach of promise to marry, seduction,
alienation of affections, and criminal conversation. Id. at 980, 986, 988. For a brief
description on the differences between these torts, see supra text accompanying note 3.
37. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals
and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REv. 305, 341 (1998) (noting that these torts descend from
an "outmoded hierarchical image of husband and wife, in which the wife is treated as the
property of the husband and the marriage is organized primarily to serve the husband's
sexual and emotional needs"); Corbett, supra note 34, at 1013 (describing historical basis);
Feinsinger, supra note 4, at 990 (noting that wives were not permitted to bring criminal
conversation claims in England); Graham, supra note 5, at 407 (explaining that one
historical reason for heartbalm claims centered on compensating a husband "for any
genealogical uncertainty that might surround the offspring of his adulterous wife").
38. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 916
(5th ed. 1984).
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dismiss the appropriateness of adultery as tort-a form of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" rationale that forever damns the torts to
extinction.
While this discomfort with the law's shameful view of women is
understandable, it is also irrelevant. The fact that adultery-centered
causes of action originate from offensive attitudes about women
should not automatically sound their death knell. The historical basis
for the torts does nothing to answer the normative question of
whether sound reasons exist to keep the torts today. Rape laws
represent a case in point. These laws suffer from the same dubious
historical pedigree as the adultery torts-the idea that damage to
women constitutes a property harm to the "owner" of the property
damaged.39 In fact, the Latin form of the word "rape" actually
connotes a form of property crime.4° Yet no one would ever suggest
that rape laws are outdated because the original rationales supporting
such laws have long been discredited. Why? Because rape is morally
abhorrent and should-indeed, must-be prohibited in any civilized
society. Loss of consortium damages, too, arose from the premise that
the wife was an "asset" of her husband for which he deserved
compensation when damaged.4' Nevertheless, over time loss of
consortium damages departed from their sexist conception and are
now a standard feature of modern-day tort law.42
The examples of rape and loss of consortium show that a law's
ignoble origins do not confine that law to forever death. Adultery-
based torts clearly operate differently in North Carolina today than
they did when originally conceived, and they should only be judged
on that basis-what they are now, not what they were then.
39. See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND
RAPE (1975) (providing broad history of rape and rape laws).
40. See Melisa J. Anderson, Note, Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex-Examining the Effect
of the Criminalization of Marital Rape in England and the Republic of Ireland, 27 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 141 (1998) (noting that rape laws were born out of a desire to
provide restitution to wronged men and that the term "rape" itself derives from the Latin
word "raptus," a form of property crime).
41. JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 160 n.56 (4th ed. 2010).
42. Id. at 161 ("States not only broadened what could be recovered under the
consortium label, but also who could recover. Most significantly, they expanded the scope
of recovery by permitting a wife to recover for loss of consortium when her husband was
tortiously injured. Virtually all states now permit either spouse to recover for loss of
consortium, and recovery is largely for such intangible harms as loss of companionship,
affection, and society." (citation omitted)); see also Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811,
819 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (landmark case extending loss of consortium claims to wives).
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B. The Threat of Blackmail
The legislative push in the 1930s to ban the heartbalm torts
derived in large part from the belief that the torts were "strongly
conducive to extortion, blackmail and public scandal. '4 3 Professor
Jane Larson describes the legislative scene of the time:
The greater sexual openness of the Progressive and New Deal
eras in the United States intensified men's fears that they could
be manipulated by women's power to grant or deny sexual
favors. In the popular culture of the period, women were
portrayed as dominating men sexually through their power to
say "no"-tricking men into marriage by conditioning consent
to sex upon promises of engagement, and once married,
withholding sex to extort money and other privileges from their
husbands. Common stereotypes were those of the "gold
digger," who married for money, and the "seductress," who
lured wealthy men into sexual liaisons and then threatened
them with lawsuits aimed at extorting hefty settlements.
Supporters of the anti-heartbalm reform movement put
forward three major arguments: first, that seduction and the
other heartbalm actions were tools for blackmail in the hands of
undeserving women; second, that even in a genuine claim for
seduction, an award of money damages could neither reverse
the loss of physical virginity nor mend emotional injury; and
finally, that the public airing of an illicit sexual relationship was
itself evidence of the complaining woman's lack of modesty and
morality, exposing her as an unworthy plaintiff.... Legislators
were outraged that a sexually active woman could exploit
conventional morality for her own profit."4
Three points jump out from this description about the role fear
of blackmail played in the demise of the heartbalm torts. First, this
prominent rationale for the abolition of the heartbalm torts applied
primarily to breach of promise to marry and seduction claims and had
little to do with the adultery-centered torts of alienation of affections
and criminal conversation.45 Second, while the sexist origins of the
heartbalm torts are often cited as a reason for their abolition, it is
43. Feinsinger, supra note 4, at 996.
44. Jane Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit'":
A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 394-95 (1993) (footnotes
omitted).
45. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1012 (noting that "remarkably," the fear of
blackmail "still is given as a reason for abrogating alienation and criminal conversation"
even though this fear never arose in connection with these torts); Larson, supra note 44, at
394 n.85.
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equally clear that the motives behind the abolition movement were
often no better and reflected the sexist and misogynistic views of male
legislators about the nature and character of women.' Third, and
most important in assessing the normative value of the torts today,
the operation of the heartbalm torts in 1920s and 1930s bears no
resemblance whatsoever to how adultery-based torts work in North
Carolina in 2012. 47 If the blackmail factor is a real risk arising from
the existence of alienation of affections and criminal conversation
claims, we should see some evidence of this fear materializing in
North Carolina, especially in the fifteen-year aftermath of some of the
high-dollar verdicts since the Hutelmyer case. But we do not.
Accordingly, despite its former prominence, the fear of blackmail
fails today to constitute a reason for eliminating the heartbalm torts.
Even if extortion were a bona fide concern in the 1930s,48 it has no
contemporary credence and cannot stand as a reason for North
Carolina to now abandon alienation of affections.
C. The Lack of Deterrent Effect
A particularly weak argument advanced by anti-heartbalm critics
centers on the ineffectiveness of the torts at deterring adultery.49 The
answer to this argument is twofold. First, the assertion that alienation
of affections and criminal conversation have no deterrence value is
just that-an assertion. This claim, so confidently stated, has never
46. See Larson, supra note 44, at 397 ("[L]atently misogynistic rhetoric fueled the
anti-heartbalm reform .... ).
47. The closest example of purported blackmail in North Carolina case law arises in
Ward v. Beaton, 141 N.C. App. 44, 539 S.E.2d 30 (2000), where the defendant asserted
fraud on the following grounds:
[T]he defendant submitted evidence of a consent order entering a divorce from
bed and board between the plaintiff and her husband on 5 August 1998, the same
day the complaint in this action was filed. This consent order relieved Mr. Ward of
payment of alimony, post-separation support and child support. Defendant asserts
on appeal that the findings in the consent order alleviating Mr. Ward of these
responsibilities evidence a fraudulent scheme on the part of plaintiff and her
husband in filing this claim for alienation of affections. Defendant contends the
fraud indicated by the consent order required the trial court to direct a verdict in
defendant's favor.
Id. at 49, 539 S.E.2d at 34. The probable lack of strength of this claim lies in the fact that
the defendant never pleaded fraud in her answer nor asserted the theory at trial. See id.
48. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1012-13 (casting doubt on whether extortion fears
were ever a real problem on any meaningful level).
49. See Nehal A. Patel, The State's Perpetual Protection of Adultery: Examining
Koesteler v. Pollard and Wisconsin's Faded Adultery Torts, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 1013, 1045-
46 (2003); Batchelor, supra note 19, at 1934-38.
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been empirically demonstrated. 0 Perhaps a vibrant and well-
publicized push to litigate adultery-based cases would convince some
number of third parties to refrain from dalliances with those married
to another. The second response to the argument is blunter: so what?
The idea that tort claims must prove their deterrent value to assure
their survival is a strange one. Professor Corbett ably demonstrates
why this proffered reason against the adultery as tort is really no
reason at all:
[C]omplete deterrence has never been required by tort law to
justify the existence of a tort. As I have suggested earlier, I
think that tort law often recognizes theories of recovery as a
reflection of society's values and for other reasons, even when
the deterrent effect may be minimal. What conduct is deterred,
for example, by the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress?51
The crowded nature of the nation's criminal and civil court
dockets is a testament to the limits of law's ability to deter disfavored
conduct.52 Law's function, and the function of torts in particular,
encompasses far more than deterrence; it is also about righting
wrongs and providing redress to a person injured by the wrongful
conduct of another.53
D. Opening the Floodgates
Another critique asserts "that allowing adultery-based torts will
overburden the courts."54 Criticism of this sort arises as part of a
larger battle between tort restrictionists and tort expansionists over
whether America is in the midst of a tort crisis or not.55 Regardless of
the outcome of this broader debate, the North Carolina experience
belies any claim that the existence of the adultery torts leads to a rush
of litigants hurrying toward the courthouse doors. A Westlaw search
50. Corbett, supra note 34, at 1016 (noting that the deterrence claim "is a matter of
opinion" and that "there is no empirical evidence to support it").
51. Id. at 1055 n.365.
52. See, e.g., Lance McMillian, Atticus Finch as Racial Accommodator: Answering
Malcolm Gladwell, 77 TENN. L. REV. 701, 717 (2010) (discussing law's inability to
motivate personal changes of heart).
53. See WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS
xlvii (2d ed. 2009) (noting that a "large branch of torts scholarship views the law of torts as
a moral enterprise, the purpose of which is to produce justice between plaintiff and
defendant").
54. Patel, supra note 49, at 1048; see also Batchelor, supra note 19, at 1938-42.
55. See Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance Settlement "Problem": The Elusive Truth
and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 221, 229 (2007).
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of North Carolina appellate opinions reveals that the term "alienation
of affections" appears only eighty-eight times from 1913 to 2012.56
Like the blackmail rationale that continues to be offered in support of
the abolition of the heartbalm torts, the idea that allowing adultery-
based claims will produce a litigation explosion lacks any relationship
to what is actually happening in a jurisdiction where the torts
continue to exist.5
7
E. Love, Marriage, and Money
A related concern centers on the inadequacy of economic
damages to compensate for the harms for which the adultery torts
allow recovery. Under this line of thinking, money is not a good
reward for a broken heart; indeed, the very act of seeking
compensation for such a harm sparks suspicion.58 This idea, known as
anticommodification, asserts that the value of marriage is "incapable
of measurement in monetary terms."5 9 In this view, tort law cannot
put back together that which has already been destroyed:
Once the love that bound [spouses] together is gone, the
marriage has lost its purpose, and there is no point in trying to
compensate monetarily for the loss of affection. Love cannot be
commodified, and marriage is not a market exchange. People
are seeking a soul mate, not a financial windfall.'
This type of assessment is both right and wrong at the same time.
It is certainly the case that money is an imprecise and poor substitute
for the damage to a wronged spouse left in adultery's wake. But this
truth is a common one in tort and fails to satisfactorily explain why
compensation should be withheld for what is a real harm. Pain and
suffering is notoriously difficult to calculate, but we still allow juries
to take their best shot.6 Tort damages for the death of a child cannot
56. WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (searching the database "North Carolina State
Cases" with term "alienation of affections").
57. The floodgate fears also seem disingenuous in that the story of tort law in the
second half of the twentieth century is one of rapidly expanding liability in a whole host of
different areas. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1024.
58. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 2616-17.
59. Id. at 2588.
60. Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 747, 781-82 (2001).
61. In tort law, for example, proof of noneconomic damages is ethereal as there exists
no objective measurement for how such damages should be calculated:
It is also contended that the 'sentimental' damages such as the diminution of the
value of her husband's society and affection and the deprivation of sexual relations
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bring that child back to life, but they are nevertheless appropriate,
and no one says otherwise. The whole point of loss of consortium is to
compensate for things lost in a marriage through the actions of a third
party. These examples show that the inherent problem of
anticommodification affects the tort system as a whole. Although
imperfect, money remains the best means we have for compensating
injured parties, including plaintiffs who assert claims for damages
arising from the injuries left in adultery's wake.
F. "Outdated"
The evolution of liberalized sexual norms clearly has played a
role in the near extinction of the heartbalm torts, leading to the claim
that these torts are "outdated" for modern times.62 Most prominently,
the tort of seduction, with its emphasis on protecting female virginity,
harkens back to an age much different than our own.63 Consequently,
a movement to revitalize seduction claims is rightly unthinkable. But
what about adultery? Even though the overwhelming majority of
Americans say they still disapprove of adultery, 6' there arguably
exists a divergence between what we say about adultery and what we
really think. Shauna Deans-a defender of adultery-based torts-
explains:
In light of this current state of family affairs, one has to ask
whether adultery has become one of the trademarks associated
with America, similar to ideals of capitalism and pastimes like
baseball and baking apple pies? The breadth of sociological
studies on marriage and intimate relationships suggest that
many, if not most American marriages are touched by adultery.
and the attendant loss of child-bearing opportunity are too personal, intangible,
and conjectural to be measured in pecuniary terms by a jury. This argument has no
merit. The logic of it would also hold a jury incompetent to award damages for
pain and suffering.
Millington v. Se. Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. 1968). When lawyers do try to
quantify these damages before the jury, their efforts are usually rejected as improper. See,
e.g., Ferry v. Checker Taxi Co., 520 N.E.2d 733, 751-52 (I11. App. Ct. 1987) (rejecting per
diem argument); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 601-02 (Mo. 1959) (rejecting job
offer argument); Red Top Cab Co. v. Capps, 270 S.W.2d 273, 275 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954) (rejecting "Golden Rule" argument).
62. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 37, at 341 (arguing that torts originate from an
"outmoded hierarchical image of husband and wife"); Batchelor, supra note 19, at 1910
(arguing for abolition of criminal conversation because it is "outdated").
63. See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 465-66 (2000)
(noting that "[I]oss of virginity is no longer objectively harmful" today in the same way it
was in times past and that, as a result, seduction claims are now rarely pursued).
64. See supra note 33.
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Another mark of the pervasive nature of adultery and infidelity
is evidenced by its popular treatment in American literature
and the media. Currently, some of the most popular daytime
television shows are solely centered on the drama of
establishing paternity when people stray outside of their
intimate relationships. These references paint a dismal picture
of the current state of intimacy in our modern relationships.
Regardless of what side one may take, the proposition that
American culture has increasingly adopted a complacent
attitude toward adultery is undeniable. Adultery has evolved
from a taboo that was once criminalized and enforced in every
jurisdiction, to a topic that currently provides the bread and
butter for many talk show hosts and more recently, has
provided some of the most salacious headlines in the news.
Moreover, Americans have become so jaded about the
frequency of infidelity that the reaction to such scandal is
nothing more than a raised eyebrow or at most, several days'
worth of gossip at the water cooler. Without question, it seems
that the repugnance toward adultery has died along with the
heartbalm torts.65
Is Deans correct in her assessment that people no longer see
fidelity in marriage as a virtue, much like they no longer value female
virginity? Perhaps. At a minimum, Blackstone's observation that
adultery counts as the greatest form of civil injury seems outdated for
modern times.66
The recent success of alienation of affections suits in North
Carolina, however, shows that the adultery torts still speak to
commonly-shared views of right and wrong.67 The experience of
actual cases represents a better barometer of where the community
stands than the mere assertions of anti-heartbalm scholars that the
torts lack a purpose in today's climate. 68 Juries matter because they
65. Shauna M. Deans, The Forgotten Side of the Battlefield in America's War on
Infidelity: A Call for the Revamping, Reviving, and Reworking of Criminal Conversation
and Alienation of Affections, 53 HOw. L.J. 377, 379-81 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
66. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 140 (1768) ("Adultery, or
criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public crime, left by our laws to
the coercion of the spiritual courts; yet, considered as a civil injury (and surely there can
be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction to the husband for it by an action of trespass vi
et armis against the adulterer, wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and
exemplary.").
67. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14 (detailing plaintiffs' recent successes in
adultery cases in North Carolina).
68. For some, "punishing" adultery through the imposition of tort liability likely
conjures up the image of Hester Prynne wearing her scarlet "A" in Nathaniel Hawthorne's
classic The Scarlet Letter. See Larson, supra note 44, at 377 & n.10 (alluding to perceptions
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are a "significant and reliable objective index of contemporary
values."'69 And when given the opportunity, juries routinely give voice
to the position that third-party interference with marriage is wrong,
suggesting that-in North Carolina, at least-adultery-based torts are
not as outdated as many claim.7 °
G. Misplaced Blame
Alienation of affections and criminal conversation claims focus
on the conduct of a third party-the stranger to the marriage who
"steals" the affections of the plaintiff's spouse.7 Placing legal
responsibility on this third party for the disintegration of a marriage
in such circumstances strikes many as a terrible misallocation of
of Prynne as a "sexual criminal"). This viewpoint-which does not necessarily sanction
adultery as something morally or socially acceptable-sees government involvement in
matters of sex as troublesome. Camille Paglia, for example, argues that the nature of
sexual relations makes them inherently unsuited to regulation:
Sexuality is a murky realm of contradiction and ambivalence. It cannot always
be understood by social models, which feminism, as an heir of nineteenth-century
utilitarianism, insists on imposing on it .... It cannot be "fixed" by codes of social
or moral convenience, whether from the political left or right. For nature's fascism
is greater than that of any society. There is a[n] ... instability in sexual relations
that we may have to accept.
CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE 13 (1991), cited in Larson, supra note 44, at 452;
see also Corbett, supra note 34, at 994 (describing position of heartbalm critics as anti-
regulation and pro-free market). This categorical hands-off approach to matters of sex can
lead to results that many may find undesirable. For instance, courts formerly refused to
entertain claims of marital rape. One of the reasons for this reluctance stemmed from
discomfort at the idea of delving into such intimate questions as consent in the context of
sex between husband and wife. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1486 (2000) ("The first prominent
modern argument for the marital rape exemption, the claim from privacy, posits that there
is something inherent in the nature of the relationship between husband and wife that
makes legal intervention inappropriate, misguided, and ultimately self-defeating. It
contends that the marital relation depends on intimacy protected from outside scrutiny,
intimacy that could not survive if the law intervened to investigate and prosecute marital
rape charges."). This same type of hesitancy to become involved in issues of marital drama
represents a key aspect of the resistance to heartbalm laws. Eventually, though, every state
rightly abolished its prohibition against marital rape. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, If All
You Have Is a Hammer: Society's Ineffective Response to Intimate Partner Violence, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 975 (2011). Despite the discomfort with asking intimate sexual
questions, when the perceived stakes are high enough, courts have willingly explored the
most private areas of the marital relationship. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
69. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (citation omitted).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 11-18 (describing jury verdicts and criticism of
those verdicts).
71. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 2, at 251 n.265 (listing and describing claims).
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responsibility.7 2 As The Eagles sang in their classic song Peaceful,
Easy Feeling:
And I found out a long time ago
What a woman can do to your soul.
Oh, but she can't take you any way,
You don't already know how to go.73
The idea here is that a stranger to the marriage lacks the power
to induce the cheating spouse to do anything the cheating spouse did
not already want to do.74 Responsibility, therefore, should rest with
the wayward spouse and not the co-participating adultery defendant.
There are several answers to this. Initially, in the analogous realm of
tortious interference with contracts, this same type of reasoning fails
to hold sway. That a party in a committed relationship-be it a
marriage or a contract-may be susceptible to straying should not
give a stranger to the relationship free rein to act as the tipping point
in pushing that party over the edge to unfaithfulness.75 Next, in
alienation of affections cases at least, one of the required evidentiary
showings is that the "defendant's wrongful and malicious acts brought
about the alienation of such love and affection" that forms the basis
of the suit.76 Under this standard, not every instance of adultery will
form the basis of a claim; rather, only when the facts support a finding
that responsibility for alienation does lie with the third-party
72. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1019-22 (explaining this anti-heartbalm argument).
73. THE EAGLES, Peaceful, Easy Feeling, on EAGLES (Asylum Records 1972).
74. In essence, this is a question of causation. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1020. A
feminist variant of this critique argues that the harm of adultery to the victimized wife
comes from within and cannot fairly be set at the feet of the third-party facilitator of the
husband's adultery:
As for women who have been betrayed by their husbands, the gendered script-if
indeed there is one-reads quite differently. There is no precise female
counterpart to the emasculation said to be experienced by men, perhaps because
women do not possess a privileged gender status. Depriving a woman of her
femininity has a different meaning than depriving a man of his masculinity and is
not invariably associated with loss of status. Instead, I suspect that the dignitary
harm many traditionally-minded women experience when they discover their
husband's adultery is related to a sense of inadequacy-that they question why
their husband was "forced" to look to someone else to fulfill his needs. This
lowering of self-worth is a status harm, to be sure, but unlike emasculation, the
cause is likely not to be located in the predatory behavior of a third party, but in
the victim's own perception of her loss of value as a sexual object.
Chamallas, supra note 37, at 341 (footnotes omitted).
75. See infra Part II.B (describing elements required to prove tortious interference
with contract claims).
76. Heller v. Somdahl, 206 N.C. App. 313,315,696 S.E.2d 857,860 (2010).
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defendant will liability attach. Finally, the blanket notion that third
parties cannot uniquely influence an otherwise committed spouse
from betraying the marriage seems to be a terrifically unrealistic
assessment of the power of temptation.77
The facts of the Hutelmyer case are instructive here. By all
accounts, Joseph and Dorothy Hutelmyer had a wonderful marriage,
one where he would write her love poems and she would accompany
him on his business trips. 78 Then one day, Mr. Hutelmyer's secretary
of six years, Margie Cox, separated from her husband. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals describes what followed:
According to her co-workers, [Cox's] demeanor when she
began her employment was "matronly." She wore
predominantly dark clothing and long skirts. Then, in May of
1992, [Cox] separated from her husband, and she, thereafter,
became openly flirtatious and spent increasingly more time
alone with Mr. Hutelmyer. [Cox's] co-workers testified that she
changed her appearance. She cut and dyed her hair and wore
short skirts, low-cut blouses, and tight clothing to the office. At
or near the same time, defendant and Mr. Hutelmyer began to
arrive at work together or within minutes of each other, to dine
together alone, and to work late hours at the office. Many
nights, [Cox] and Mr. Hutelmyer were the only employees
working late. The testimony of [Cox's] co-workers also revealed
that although defendant rarely traveled in connection with her
employment prior to 1990, in 1992, she began accompanying
Mr. Hutelmyer on business trips.
[Mrs. Hutelmyer's] evidence further showed that beginning
in 1993, Mr. Hutelmyer began to spend a considerable amount
of time at [Cox's] home. [Cox's] former neighbor testified that
she frequently saw Mr. Hutelmyer's vehicle parked at
defendant's home overnight, from approximately 9:00 p.m. until
77. Professor Corbett captures the risks that face any married person, even those
dead-set on remaining faithful to his or her spouse:
I think these torts are based on the presumption that marriages are delicate
relationships, which often teeter in the balance. It is often said that marriage is
hard work. That belief recognizes that spouses have to deal with many matters that
are not always fun, including balancing budgets, making decisions about children,
caring for aging parents and in-laws, and so forth. A third person, who offers the
fun and excitement of sexual relations unencumbered by these other weighty
matters, might be an attractive diversion, or more.
Corbett, supra note 34, at 1019.
78. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 367, 514 S.E.2d 554, 557 (1999).
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5:30 a.m. the following morning. In addition, a co-worker of
[Cox] and Mr. Hutelmyer testified that when she visited her
parents, who resided near [Cox], she observed Mr. Hutelmyer's
car at defendant's house at all hours of the day and night.
Co-workers of [Cox] and Mr. Hutelmyer also testified that
the couple flaunted their familiarity with one another. The
lovers would hold hands at the workplace, and defendant would
sit in Mr. Hutelmyer's office in a dress with her legs thrown
sideways across the chair.79
Mr. Hutelmyer betrayed his wife. He is morally and legally
accountable for his actions. But does Mr. Hutelmyer's own blame
absolve Margie Cox of all fault? Cox knowingly and intentionally
engaged in a series of choices that she knew would cause Dorothy
Hutelmyer great harm and pain.8" Every day, there are tort cases in
America that hold defendants liable for a lot less than that.81
II. MAINSTREAMING ADULTERY AS TORT
Critics of the adultery-centered torts frame the torts as being far
outside the mainstream of American law. The low standing of these
torts in the national legal community has precluded a serious look at
the continuing merits of these adultery-based actions. North
Carolina's stubborn willingness to continue to entertain alienation of
affections and criminal conversation claims proves mystifying to most
interested observers, which explains the contempt from the legal
community directed toward North Carolina in the wake of the
Hutelmyer case and others like it.82 For those convinced that all of the
79. Id.
80. See Gray v. Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724, 730-31, 381 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1989)
(detailing "defendant's phone calls in which defendant told plaintiff he was having sex
with plaintiff's wife" and "the defendant's act of driving up in front of plaintiff's business,
blowing the horn, and then in the presence of plaintiff kissing plaintiffs wife, unbuttoning
her blouse and then putting his hand inside").
81. Consider, for example, a garden-variety car wreck caused by a driver's negligence.
These cases are commonplace and can rest on nothing more than a moment of inattention
that causes a breach of reasonable care. Now compare this everyday car wreck with a tort
claim arising from adultery. If Steve seduces Susie for the sole purpose of alienating her
from her husband John, the prevalent position denies John a recovery against Steve for
John's loss of companionship, comfort, and sexual relations. Yet if Steve negligently hurts
Susie in a car wreck and causes the exact same losses, John does have a claim. The
inconsistency of these outcomes cannot be blamed on the relative culpability of Steve in
each scenario; he is clearly more blameworthy for intentionally interfering with John and
Susie's marriage than he is for his accidental bad driving. Margie Cox's blameworthiness
stands in similar stead.
82. See supra notes 11 and 19 (describing criticism of North Carolina law).
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heartbalm torts are beyond redemption, North Carolina's position
seems awfully archaic and backwards.
The defense mounted in this Article confronts and rejects this
claim of outdated isolation. Far from being some strange relic from
another time, adultery as tort-both in terms of its goals and
mechanics-is well within the bounds of conventional legal doctrine.
In support of this argument, I juxtapose adultery-based torts with
three areas of discrete legal interest: the gay marriage debate, claims
for interference with commercial relationships, and claims for loss of
consortium. The comparisons that follow highlight that the premises
underlying adultery-focused torts-when applied to other legal
issues-find great support from courts and scholars alike. These areas
of support include the role of the state in the formation and
protection of marriage, the interest of tort law in protecting
relationships from third-party interference, and the law's willingness
to compensate injured tort plaintiffs for damage to the marital bed.
By placing the adultery torts in this broader context, the door opens
for claims such as alienation of affections to once again join the ranks
of respectable legal discourse.
A. The Relationship Between Marriage and the State: Why the Gay
Marriage Debate Supports Continuation of Adultery as Tort
The national debate over gay marriage has produced a deep and
sustained fissure in American society over the last ten years. 83 Both
sides of this divide-those who cast marriage equality as the moral
equivalent of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and those who
think acceptance of gay marriage heralds the end of civilization-
place enormous importance on the ultimate outcome of this question.
But why? For the past forty years, certain churches have performed
services where gay couples come together to form a marriage bond in
a religious ceremony. 84 This longstanding and increasingly common
practice has never generated the intensity that characterizes the
marriage wars of today. Rather, it is only when the dimensions of gay
83. See, e.g., David Masci, The Gay Marriage Debate: Where It Stands, PEW RES. (July
10, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1279/gay-marriage-debate-2009 (describing the
growth of the controversy).
84. See Mary Ann Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1763 (2005)
(describing marriage of gay couple in 1971 by Methodist minister); Troy D. Perry, Whose
God Do You Serve?, WHOSOEVER.ORG (Mar. 2004),
http://whosoever.org/v8i6/perry.shtml (where Perry notes that "[iun 1969, [he] performed
the first same-sex church wedding in the U.S. at the predominantly gay Metropolitan
Community Church of Los Angeles").
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marriage transformed from a religious ceremony issue to a civil
ceremony issue that the battle lines became drawn.
What accounts for this metamorphosis whereby gay couples feel
compelled to seek recognition at both the civil and religious level
while opponents of gay marriage, largely indifferent to gay marriage
inside of churches, see government licensing of same-sex couples as a
civilization-defining issue? Part of the answer to this question is that
civil recognition of gay marriage allows same-sex couples to enjoy a
number of benefits and privileges that accrue only to married couples.
This special treatment of married individuals-by both governmental
and non-governmental actors-encompasses a number of economic
areas of life such as inheritance rights, property privileges, tax breaks,
insurance policies, and even rental car agreements.85
This aspect of the gay marriage issue, however, does not
adequately account for the passions exhibited by all the players in this
ongoing national dialogue. Something else is at work. For example,
the anti-gay marriage side does not base its opposition on the
possibility that gay couples will have access to tax breaks and the like
once married. Similarly, while gay couples who want to marry
naturally have an interest in enjoying the same economic advantages
of the marriage institution as their heterosexual counterparts, the
fight for gay marriage is not primarily a fight for these financial
benefits. This point is highlighted by what happened in early 2004
when San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom decided to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. In just a month, the "Winter of Love"
witnessed thousands of gay couples flock to San Francisco to get
married, including couples from "at least 20 U.S. states and numerous
foreign countries."86 This willingness of same-sex couples across the
country-and the world-to travel to California to get married, even
though the marriages would not be recognized back home and thus
not change the legal status of these same-sex couples, demonstrates
that emotional fulfillment, not rational self-interest, serves as the
engine that drives many gay couples seeking matrimonial equality.87
85. Case, supra note 84, at 1771.
86. Mark Morford, San Francisco's Winter of Love, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 1, 2004),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2004/03/san-franciscos-winter-love.
87. That the act of marrying has a greater meaning apart from simply entering a legal
transaction is shown by the nature of marriage ceremonies (inviting family and friends)
and the celebrations that typically follow (the wedding cake, etc.). When people sign a
will, they do not invite everyone they know over to witness the occasion and celebrate
joyously afterward. Marriage, however, is different. The joy expressed during the Winter
of Love reflects the profound meaning that marriage has in American culture:
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The gay marriage controversy, therefore, is not mainly about
economic rights; rather, it is about recognition-and not just any
recognition. Gay marriages that occur under the auspices of a church
already receive recognition "as old as the book of Genesis."88 But
being God-ordained is not enough. The linchpin of the gay marriage
debate-the thing that gay marriage proponents strive for and the
thing that gay marriage opponents most resist-centers on this:
recognition of same-sex marriage by the state. The conflict is not
about marriage per se, but about licensing of marriage by the
government, which is a different thing, as the institution of marriage
existed long before state licensing of marriage.89 Both sides of the gay
marriage divide have thus become invested in the idea that "[c]ivil
marriage is a unique expressive resource used by people to express
themselves and to constitute their identities."9 Judge Posner captures
the implications of this realization and in so doing identifies what is at
stake for supporters and defenders of gay marriage alike: "To permit
persons of the same sex to marry is to declare, or more precisely to be
understood by many people to be declaring, that homosexual
marriage is a desirable, even a noble condition in which to live."91 The
The City by the Bay has been momentarily revitalized, reinvented, our freshly
minted young mayor unexpectedly thrusting us into the international limelight and
slapping our collective face with the leather glove of change and calm, deliberate,
uncharted ideological disobedience. That and lots of giddy happy homosexual
couples in love, smooching on the steps of city hall.
Id.; see also Marisa Lagos et al., Same-Sex Weddings Start with Union of Elderly San
Francisco Couple, S. F. CHRON., JUNE 16, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/06/17IMNPQllA3VF.DTL (describing the ceremony of Phyliss
Lyon, 83, and Del Martin, 87, who were legally wed in 2008 after being a couple for 50
years); Angela Macropoulos, Gay Marriage: After a Battle, a Celebration, N. Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/gay-marriage-after-a-battle-a-
celebration (reporting one gay man's reason for marrying his long-time partner as "[w]hy
not do this to feel great about having a 28-year relationship?" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
88. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185,186 (Minn. 1971) ("The institution of marriage
as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children
within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis." (citing Skinner v. Okla. ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942))).
89. Id.; see also Case, supra note 84, at 1766 ("The state has been a relative latecomer
in the regulation of marriage.").
90. Cruz, supra note 23, at 933.
91. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 312 (1992); see also Case, supra note 84,
at 1795 ("Opponents of state recognition for same-sex marriage often insist that such
recognition would undercut their own, heterosexual marriages .... ); Vincent J. Samar,
Privacy and the Debate over Same-Sex Marriage Versus Unions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 783,
784 (2005) (explaining the view of gay marriage opponents that gay marriage bans are
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battle over state-licensing of same-sex marriage has essentially
become a tug-of-war over whether the government will or will not
make the declaration that Posner here identifies-that gay marriage
is "a noble condition in which to live." 92
That this declaration hangs in the balance rests on two widely-
shared assumptions. First, the word "marriage" contains great
meaning and power.93 The force of the word can be measured by the
tenacity with which each side of the marriage debate claims
ownership over it. Both gay activists and traditional marriage
defenders rightly realize the significance of nomenclature when it
comes to "marriage":
[W]ords do matter. Words can insult, degrade, shame, and hurt.
Moreover, words shape reality. A rose by any other name might
smell as sweet, but if we artificially give different names to two
varieties of roses, over time we would come to think of them
quite differently. And in the same-sex marriage context, there
can be no mistaking the implication of the use of a different
word. It is, and is meant to be, insulting, degrading, shameful,
and hurtful.94
"necessary to defend marriage as a relationship between one man and one woman from
what is perceived to be a pernicious and immoral attack from outside the institution").
92. Compare Case, supra note 84, at 1775 ("Withholding from same-sex couples the
opportunity to marry devalues their unions both symbolically and practically."), with
William J. Bennett, But Not a Very Good Idea, Either, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at A19
("Recognizing the legal union of gay and lesbian couples would represent a profound
change in the meaning and definition of marriage. Indeed, it would be the most radical
step ever taken in the deconstruction of society's most important institution.").
93. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, To Say "I Do": Shahar v. Bowers, Same-Sex Marriage,
and Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 433-34 (1998)
("[Tihe word 'marriage' carries a uniquely intense, resonant, and emotional force in our
language and culture.").
94. Geoffrey R. Stone, Same-Sex Marriage and the Meaning of Words, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 5, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/same-sex-
marriage-and-the b_347593.html. For this reason, any compromise that grants same-sex
couples the right to form state-recognized "civil unions" likely will fail to deliver the stamp
of legitimacy that these gay couples seek:
First, civil unions do not carry the same social meaning as marriage, nor are they
intended to imbue such social meaning. In fact, marriage itself will undergo a
change in its social meaning once same-sex couples are admitted into it, which is
what the President and some others are worried about. Second, treating the two
institutions as if they were the same overlooks important ways that culture shapes
self-esteem and regulates the development of individual identities, and along with
that, impedes or promotes true human autonomy. Finally, equality requires giving
same-sex couples the same opportunities to marry as opposite-sex couples and not
channeling them into a less-regarded institutional status. Here it is also worth
noting that affording same-sex couples the right to marry is likely to reconstruct
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Second, the combination of the word "marriage" with the
perceived legitimacy supplied to relationships stamped by the
imprimatur of the state necessitates the conclusion that declaring
same-sex marriages to be legal is to also declare that they are
normatively good.
This near-universal consensus that the government occupies the
preeminent role in the construction and sanction of the marriage
relationship carries with it certain implications. If state involvement is
so critical in supplying marriage with its modern meaning, then it
follows that the state should be empowered to protect that which it
has birthed. The contrary position-that the state's place is essential
on the front end but weak and powerless after that-is strikingly
inconsistent. In any licensing regime, the state's interest in that which
it licenses remains ongoing.95 Marriage, a "potentially dangerous,
heavily regulated activit[y]," 96 should be no different. And this is
where adultery-centered torts such as alienation of affections come in.
There exists great discrepancy between how the conventional
wisdom views the gay marriage issue (state involvement is good) and
how that same conventional wisdom views adultery as tort (state
involvement is bad). Perhaps the reason for this uneven outlook is
historical happenstance. The heartbalm torts have been disfavored
for such a long time that it is likely that many courts and scholars
dismiss them without pausing to consider whether any of the torts
the institution of marriage so as to move it away from its historical connection to
gender roles and female subservience and towards close-to-equal partnership.
Samar, supra note 91, at 785 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Lawyers, for example, face continuing regulation from the state even after they
pass the bar and become licensed. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 84-1 to 84-38 (2011). This
regulation includes comprehensive annual training requirements to ensure ongoing
professional competence:
The annual [Continuing Legal Education] requirements in North Carolina are 12
hours of approved CLE. Of these 12 hours, 2 must be in the area of professional
responsibility or professionalism or any combination thereof .... At least once
every three calendar years, each lawyer must complete an additional hour of
professional responsibility devoted exclusively to instruction in substance abuse
awareness or debilitating mental conditions, and a lawyer's professional
responsibilities .... The CLE rules also require every active lawyer, regardless of
exempt status, to file an annual written report of his/her CLE activity for the
preceding year .... All active members admitted to the North Carolina State Bar
after January 1, 2011, must complete the New Admittee Professionalism program
in the year the member is first required to meet CLE requirements.
CLE Requirements in North Carolina, N. C. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. (May 7, 2012),
http://www.nccle.org/atty/a-requirements.aspx.
96. Case, supra note 84, at 1770.
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possess any modern utility. Or perhaps the marriage-protecting
torts-alienation of affections and criminal conversation-have
effectively become indistinguishable from the more questionable
claims of breach of promise to marry and seduction.' The gay
marriage debate underscores the importance of marriage and the
state's role in managing marriage. We know, too, that tort law is a
common tool of government regulation.9" There should be nothing
unusual, therefore, in using the law of torts to protect marriage from
one of its greatest threats: adultery. The tort of alienation of
affections-designed to protect from third-party interference the
integrity of the marriage bonds that mean so much to so many-
respects and reinforces values shared across the ideological spectrum,
in terms of both its purpose (protecting marriage) and its means (tort
law).99 From this perspective, North Carolina's continuing embrace of
the adultery-centered torts is not as out of step as it seems.
97. See supra Parts I.B, I.F.
98. See Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313,
2314 (2010) ("Viewing tort law as a system of deterrence or regulation is now standard
within the legal literature.").
99. This defense of the heartbalm torts succeeds only if one accepts the premise
shared by gay marriage advocates and gay marriage opponents that the state should be in
the business of regulating marriage in the first place. It is not readily apparent that this
should be the case. For instance, there exist significant differences in the level of
interference with the institution of marriage between the United States (heavy state
involvement including the conflation of civil and religious marriage) and Europe (strict
separation of civil and religious marriage). See Case, supra note 84, at 1793 ("It may seem
a paradox that the United States, with a much greater commitment to separation of church
and state, conflates civil and religious marriage to a far greater extent than some
continental European countries in which church-state cooperation is constitutionally
secured."). Additionally, as the marriage wars have waged in America over the last
decade, a number of scholars have concluded that government should extricate itself from
the marriage business altogether. See Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian" Argument for
Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1222 (2006) (arguing that from the
Judeo-Christian perspective "marriage is the province of religious communities, and not
the state, and empowering the state to define marriage uniformly not only profanes a holy
institution but threatens the ultimate autonomy and authority of religious communities
with respect to marriage"); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
667, 672 (2010) ("[I]t would be a lot better, as a matter of both political theory and public
policy, if the state withdrew from the marrying business, leaving the expressive domain to
religions and to other private groups, and offering civil unions to both same- and opposite-
sex couples."); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for
Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) ("The law should not
define, regulate, or recognize marriage. Marriage-the structured, publicly-proclaimed,
communally-supported relationship of mutual commitment-should become solely a
religious and cultural institution with no legal definition or status.").
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B. The State as Relationship Defender: The Striking Similarity
Between Business Torts and Adultery as Tort
Calvin Coolidge famously said that "[t]he chief business of
America is business." 00 For commercial activity to flourish, economic
actors need to be confident in the validity and stability of the
agreements in which they enter. Toward this end, the law of contracts
enforces mutual promises between parties that result from a "meeting
of the minds."10' Accordingly, when a party breaches its promise to
another, it must pay damages for harm occasioned by the breach.102
Despite the universal availability of this remedy against the breaching
party under the rules of contract, tort law offers additional relief in
certain situations: tortious interference with contracts, which is
recognized in every state.'0 3 Such a tort's existence cannot be even
close to fully explained by economic reasoning, as contract law
adequately protects a party's financial interest in the performance of
a given promise. The origin instead revolves around protecting the
integrity of relationships and is "one part of a larger body of tort law
aimed at protection of relationships, some economic and some
personal."1 0
4
100. President Calvin Coolidge, Address to the American Society of Newspaper
Editors: The Press Under a Free Government (Jan. 17, 1925), in CALVIN COOLIDGE,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES 187 (1926).
101. See Tal Kastner, "Bartleby": A Story of Boilerplate, 23 LAW & LITERATURE 365,
368 (2011) (describing history of contract law and concept of "meeting of the minds").
102. See Weyerhauser Co. v. Supply Co., 292 N.C. 557, 560-61, 234 S.E.2d 605, 607
(1977) ("Damages are allowed for breach of contract as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made or which will
compensate the injured party for the loss which fulfillment of the contract could have
prevented or the breach of it has entailed." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
103. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1030.
104. KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, at 978. The relationship-protecting function of the
tort benefits society because it fosters stability in relationships that need stability in order
for society to function:
By expressing society's interest in the integrity of contract, and by making
contracts marginally more reliable, the tort implicitly encourages strangers to a
given contract to plan their own commercial activity by relying on the terms of that
contract. Thus, the tort facilitates the ability of contracts to stabilize commercial
activity-to provide economic predictability not only for the parties to a contract
but also for strangers. In an interdependent, industrial economy without central
planning, this attenuated effect of contracts is arguably crucial for a coordinated
allocation of future resources. Thus, society's interest in the formal integrity of
contract, per se, is quite distinct from any interest society may have in the most
efficient allocation of the goods and services underlying a particular contract.
Formal contracts, because they embody binding promises of future performance,
are key structural elements for the organization of a market economy. Contractual
2016 [Vol. 90
ADULTERY AS TORT
Comparing the respective elements and interests underlying
tortious interference with contracts and alienation of affections
reveals a number of close parallels. In North Carolina, five elements
are required to prevail on a tortious interference claim:
To establish a claim for tortious interference with contract, a
plaintiff must show: (1) a valid contract between the plaintiff
and a third person which confers upon the plaintiff a
contractual right against a third person; (2) the defendant
knows of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally induces
the third person not to perform the contract; (4) and in doing so
acts without justification; (5) resulting in actual damage to
plaintiff. °5
A review of the elements of alienation of affections shows the same
type of considerations at work:
The elements of an alienation of affections action are: (1) a
marriage with genuine love and affection; (2) the alienation and
destruction of the marriage's love and affection; and (3) a
showing that defendant's wrongful and malicious acts brought
about the alienation of such love and affection. 1°6
In both torts, the central issues to be decided are: (a) whether the
relationship was a functioning one; (b) whether the relationship is
destroyed; (c) whether the defendant is responsible for this
destruction; and (d) whether the defendant acts with the requisite
intentionality. The overlap between the two torts continues when one
considers that the relevant state interests-protecting family
relationships and protecting business relationships-would at least
seem equivalent.
While North Carolina stands essentially alone in sustaining tort
actions arising from adultery, it is not alone in protecting contractual
relationships from third-party interference. This dichotomy in
treatment is actually heightened because the protection against third-
obligations can be seen as intertwining and forming a grid-like foundation of
economic predictability upon which other forms of commercial activity may build.
Danforth, supra note 25, at 1513-14. This same type of stability-enhancing reasoning
supports the tort of alienation of affections as well. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1033-34.
105. United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 386 (1988).
One scholar helpfully explains the tort in this way: "Notice of Promisee's contract rights is
not enough by itself, nor is notice combined with persuasion of Promisor by Inducer not to
perform. The inducement tort requires the conjunction of notice, persuasion by the offer
of better terms, and receipt of benefits by Inducer." Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering
Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 885 n.25 (1990).
106. Heller v. Somdahl, 206 N.C. App. 313, 315,696 S.E.2d 857,860 (2010).
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party contractual interference throughout the United States also
extends to prospective relationships that have not even formally
reached the agreement stage.10 7 The strange result is that in most
jurisdictions courts are more willing to use tort law to protect the
possibility of a prospective commercial relationship than the reality of
an ongoing marital relationship. 108
I argue that North Carolina's recognition of both sets of torts is a
more consistent position than the majority view that distinguishes
between marital and business relationships. Nothing in standard tort
doctrine suggests why these two types of torts deserve different
treatment. 1 9 Nor can the state's interest in promoting the possibility
of business relationships reasonably be considered greater than its
interest in promoting stable marriages. In fact, the reverse is true as
the marriage relationship stands as the proverbial "building block" of
society."0 In the words of the Supreme Court, marriage is an
"institution [in which] the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.""11 Language such as this, long part
of the conversation of political and legal discourse in America, would
suggest a much more vigorous role for tort law in the protection of
107. See DIAMOND, LEVINE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 338-39 (describing the
tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations which "allows
recovery when the defendant intentionally and unjustifiably disrupts the victim's economic
expectations not embodied in an actual contract"). In North Carolina, this additional layer
of commercial protection takes the form of tortious interference with business relations
and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. See MLC Auto., LLC v.
Town of Southern Pines, 207 N.C. App. 555, 571, 702 S.E.2d 68, 79 (2010) ("To establish
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant, without justification, induced a third party to refrain from entering into a
contract with the plaintiff, which would have been made absent the defendant's
interference."), affid, 365 N.C. 211, 710 S.E.2d 23 (2011); Market Am., Inc. v. Christman-
Orth, 135 N.C. App. 143, 157-58, 520 S.E.2d 570, 581 (1999) ("As a general proposition
any interference with free exercise of another's trade or occupation, or means of
livelihood, by preventing people by force, threats, or intimidation from trading with,
working for, or continuing [her] in their employment is unlawful." (citations omitted)).
108. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, at 978 (describing how courts have
"continually expanded the tort" of commercial tortious interference over time).
109. On this point, some have concluded that both sets of torts should be extremely
limited. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34
ARK. L. REV. 335, 336-37 (1980) (arguing against a rule of "universal liability" for lines of
torts).
110. See Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalance, 107 MICH. L. REV.
999, 1012 (2009) (noting "[m]arriage's long track record as a building block for families
and a foundation for beneficial relations between the sexes").
111. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
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marriage than in the protection of contractual or prospective business
relationships.112 But instead we see the opposite state of affairs.
The reason for the differential treatment of marriage and
economic torts very likely goes back to the enduring prejudice held
by the majority of the legal community against the heartbalm torts.
This bias means that the similarity between the adultery-based torts
and business interference torts simply does not matter because the
heartbalm torts are so disfavored. As demonstrated earlier, however,
the case against the heartbalm torts was never as strong as generally
believed, even more so when contrasted with the way the torts
presently operate in North Carolina.113 Alienation of affections, in
particular, deserves a fresh look from scholars, courts, and
legislatures. Such an open-minded assessment of this tort, including
its close symmetry with the widely-accepted business interference
torts, would reveal that this claim sits comfortably within the
mainstream of American tort law. 14 As evidenced by the treatment of
economic torts, the state has an active interest in using tort law to
protect relationships deemed critical to the functioning of a well-
ordered society. In this role as relationship defender, tort law should
protect from third-party interference society's most important
relationship of all: marriage.
112. Professor Case, however, questions the degree to which the state really is invested
in the promotion of marriage:
We ask little more of ... couples marrying than that they comply with otherwise
applicable law. To the extent that anything remains of government promotion of
"human goods" through marriage ... it is the assumption that the social good is
likely to be promoted when government facilitates people working together to
achieve joint ends. Perhaps at some extremely high level of generality this accords
with the scriptural injunction that "two are better than one, because they have a
good reward for their labor," but it is hardly a thick and rich ethical vision that is
presently being given state sponsorship.
Case, supra note 84, at 1782 (quoting Ecclesiastes 4:9).
113. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1011 (doubting that "reasons articulated thus far"
adequately explain why heartbalm torts should not exist).
114. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, at 915 ("[T]he law of torts is concerned not
only with the protection of interests of personality and of property, tangible or intangible,
but also with what may be called 'relational' interests, founded upon the relation in which
the plaintiff stands toward one or more third persons. An interference with the
continuance of the relation, unimpaired, may be redressed by a tort action; and of this the
relations of the family are a conspicuous example." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
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C. Deposing the Marriage Bed: Loss of Consortium and Adultery as
Tort
The close nexus between alienation of affections and prevailing
tort doctrines is not limited to the law's treatment of third-party
interference with existing or prospective commercial relationships.
There is also significant common ground between alienation of
affections and loss of consortium, the latter of which is a "well-
established item of tort damages" designed to compensate spouses for
a loss of "intangible family relations." ''1 Loss of consortium arises
when a third-party tortfeasor disrupts the relationship between the
plaintiff and plaintiff's spouse-typically by negligently inflicting an
injury upon the plaintiff's spouse that prevents the spouse from
fulfilling his or her pre-injury marital role." 6 Still, these claims are not
limited to physical injuries that make consortium physically difficult;
they also arise when "one spouse is subjected to false imprisonment
or malicious prosecution, libel or slander, or intentional infliction of
mental distress, provided an actual loss of consortium results to the
other spouse. 117
In essence, claims for alienation of affections and loss of
consortium seek recovery for the very same loss. As Professor Robert
115. SHAPO, supra note 28, at 422.
116. See DIAMOND, LEVINE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 160 (providing an
example of a loss of consortium claim arising from a car wreck). Initially, the law only
allowed husbands to assert claims for loss of consortium for the usual property-based
justifications discussed earlier. See supra Part I.A. Over time, this discriminatory
application of loss of consortium went away. One early case explains:
The actual injury to the wife from the loss of consortium, which is the basis of the
action, is the same as the actual injury to the husband from that cause. His right to
the conjugal society of his wife is no greater than her right to the conjugal society
of her husband. Marriage gives to each the same rights in that regard. Each is
entitled to the comfort, companionship, and affection of the other. The rights of
the one and the obligations of the other spring from the marriage contract, are
mutual in character, and attach to the husband as husband, and to the wife as wife.
Any interference with these rights, whether of the husband or of the wife, is a
violation, not only of a natural right, but also of a legal right, arising out of the
marriage relation. It is a wrongful interference with that which the law both
confers and protects.
Bennett v. Bennett, 23 N.E. 17, 18 (N.Y. 1889).
117. KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, at 932. This allowance of recovery for economic
and non-economic intangible harms-of which "affections" is certainly a species-is a
common feature of tort law. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 31 (1999) ("[T]he
scope of conversion ... covers not only ordinary goods but a wide range of documents,
such as insurance policies, bills of lading, checks and other forms of negotiable
instruments, where the value of the thing is lodged in the intangible right, not the paper
itself.").
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Brown explained in 1934, "[d]espite the name which is universally
given to [alienation of affections], it is almost universally agreed that
the gist of it is not the loss of affections but rather the loss of
consortium-a concept of very much broader content."'18 The North
Carolina experience with both claims dovetails with this observation.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina described the value of an
alienation of affections claim as originating from the "conjugal rights
to the society, affection and assistance" of one's spouse. 9 Using
similar language, the North Carolina Court of Appeals explained that
a claim for loss of consortium permits recovery for a spouse's loss of
"service, society, companionship, sexual gratification and
affection.' 20 Given that alienation of affections and loss of
consortium seek compensation for the same loss, one of the chief
critiques of the heartbalm claims-that they "implicate[] no injury
that was properly compensable in tort"121-is dubious on its face. In
light of the common acceptance of loss of consortium claims, if there
is a problem with adultery as tort, it cannot be grounded on the claim
that the damages a plaintiff seeks are improper. In everyday tort
litigation, these damages are routine.
As in alienation of affections claims, proving loss of consortium
also requires delving into many of the sexual matters that traditional
heartbalm critics claim should be off-limits. Consider that any claim
of personal injury-emotional or physical-carries with it the
potential to seek relief for loss of consortium. 12 Objections to the
adultery torts based on discomfort with prying into the secrets of the
marital bed fail to recognize the pervasive role such questions already
play in tort cases. Suppose the case of a wife who seeks loss of
consortium damages after her husband is injured in a car wreck
caused by the defendant's negligence. During the wife's deposition,
any competent and thorough defense lawyer will ask the wife a series
of embarrassing questions:
118. Robert C. Brown, The Action for Alienation of Affections, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 472,
472 (1934); see also Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (noting
loss of consortium "includes love, affection, companionship, sexual relations, etc.").
119. Chestnut v. Sutton, 207 N.C. 256, 257,176 S.E. 743, 743 (1934).
120. Keys v. Duke Univ., 112 N.C. App. 518, 521,435 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1993).
121. Graham, supra note 5, at 428.
122. This is true even beyond garden-variety tort suits such as accident claims; loss of
consortium is often invoked in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Jones v.
Southcorr, L.L.C., 324 F. Supp. 2d 765, 783 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (discussing loss of consortium
claim).
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* How often did you and your husband have sex before the
accident?
" How would you describe the quality of that sex?
* What sexual positions did you and your husband use during
sex prior to the accident?
" How often do you and your husband have sex since the
accident?
* How would you describe the quality of that sex?
* Are there sexual positions that you no longer use due to your
husband's injury?12 1
Questions such as these pierce the sexual intimacy that exists
between husband and wife. They are awkward and uncomfortable for
the witness under oath to have to answer in front of a room full of
strangers at either deposition or trial. The nature of loss of
consortium claims, however, requires that these questions be asked
about the state of the plaintiff couple's sexual relationship both
before and after the accident to determine the level of damages
caused by the defendant's tortious conduct. The key point is that no
one points to the embarrassing aspects of these inquiries as a reason
for abolishing loss of consortium claims. Rather, such questions are
accepted as necessary given the relationship between the type of
damages being sought and the intimate quality of the proof necessary
to show those damages. This realistic understanding as to how tort
law often operates in the trenches should put to bed any question as
applied to adultery-focused claims that marital issues are too delicate
a subject for judicial resolution. The bottom line is that courts hear
these issues all the time. 124
Finally, loss of consortium damages affirm the worth of adultery
actions in tort in one other way. Typically, loss of consortium
damages are only available to married individuals.125 As a result,
123. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 27 ("If you are bringing a lawsuit, you have to
understand that when you allege loss of consortium, you are opening up the door on the
most intimate parts of your life. Defense attorneys will often ask highly personal
questions-how often did you have sex before the injury, how often do you have sex now,
how exactly does the injury make sex more difficult, have either of you ever strayed from
the marriage, etc.").
124. See 11 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.02[1] (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2011)
(noting that consortium cases are "widely recognized" and listing cases).
125. See Alisha M. Carlile, Note, Like Family: Rights of Nonmarried Cohabitational
Partners in Loss of Consortium Actions, 46 B.C. L. REv. 391, 393 (2005) ("[T]he great
majority of courts have clung to a bright-line no marriage/no recovery rule which has
[Vol. 902022
ADULTERYAS TORT
"[c]ohabitants, including 'significant others' and 'life companions,'
have been refused consortium rights, with courts expressing concerns
about expansive liability, fraudulent claims and a purported state
interest in marriage."' 6 Children, too, are routinely denied the right to
recover for consortium damages.17 The bright-line rule that loss of
consortium is marriage-dependent underscores the broad recognition
that promoting marriage is an important role for tort law to play. The
relationship between alienation of affections and loss of consortium,
therefore, extends beyond the fact that the two claims seek to
compensate plaintiffs for identical harms. Both claims also vindicate
the same important state interest, which again represents a
manifestation of how the adultery-based torts naturally fit within the
broader context of American law. Alienation of affections remains a
sound cause of action because marriage is a socially valuable
institution that should be guarded against the injurious actions of
third parties.
III. IMPROVING ADULTERY AS TORT IN NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina's almost singular embrace of adultery-remedying
torts should be a source of commendation, not condemnation. Tort
law is injury law, and few things produce as devastating an injury as
adultery:
Adultery is almost always debilitating for victimized spouses.
They can suffer tremendous emotional damage, loss of trust,
troubling mental insecurities, decreased job performance, and
financial insecurity (especially when adultery leads to divorces
involving children). What is even more tragic is that currently,
most law in the United States does little to remedy the mental
damage caused by unfaithful spouses.128
Because of adultery's terribly high costs, because of the state's role in
managing marriage, because of the law's broader interest in
protecting relationships from third-party interference, and because
tort doctrine already seeks to vindicate the very same interests
protected by alienation of affection claims, North Carolina's
excluded nonmarried cohabitational partners."). As recently as 1996, no state recognized
loss of consortium for unmarried couples. See Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory
for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, But Not Hell Either, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1107, 1146
n.161 (1996).
126. DIAMOND, LEVINE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 162 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 161.
128. Patel, supra note 49, at 1013-14.
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recognition of adultery-centered causes of action, unusual as it is,
constitutes sound public policy.
This does not mean, however, that North Carolina is perfect. In
this Part, I offer a number of suggestions to improve the operation of
adultery as tort in North Carolina while still remaining true to the
interests that adultery-based torts are designed to serve. I start with a
reconsideration of the tort of criminal conversation.
A. Abolish Criminal Conversation
Unlike alienation of affections, liability for criminal conversation
does not turn on evidence that a third party disrupted an otherwise
happy marriage. Indeed, there is no requirement that a third party
even know that a marriage exists. 129 Instead, the only real question is
whether the defendant in a criminal conversation case had sex with a
person who was at the time married to someone else:
Criminal conversation is adultery. The cause of action is based
on the violation of the fundamental right to exclusive sexual
intercourse between spouses .... [T]he gravamen of the cause
of action ... is the defilement of plaintiff's wife by the
defendant. The elements of the tort are the actual marriage
between the spouses and sexual intercourse between defendant
and the plaintiff's spouse during the coverture. 130
This type of standard, divorced from any conception of fault, is a
species of strict liability in that liability flows merely from the act
itself. 31 Consequently, under criminal conversation, "it [is] irrelevant
whether the adulterous spouse initiated the relationship, whether the
adultery occurred while the spouses were living apart, whether the
defendant was unaware of the marriage, or whether the adulterous
spouse misrepresented his or her marital status."' 132
129. Moran, supra note 60, at 775.
130. Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199, 200-01, 557 S.E.2d 189, 190 (2001)
(alternation in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Moran, supra note 60, at 775. One North Carolina practitioner provides a
hypothetical demonstrating the potential harshness of the criminal conversation rule:
"Assume Bill has met Robin on the Internet. He portrays himself as a single doctor. After
the tenth date Robin and Bill have sexual relations. Can Bill's wife sue Robin?
Absolutely!" Mary Nell Craven, Teutonian Triangles: Practical Pointers in the Defense of
Heartbalm Actions, FAM. F. (N.C. Bar Ass'n Family Law Section) June 2007, at 1, 1.
132. Moran, supra note 60, at 775; cf. Pharr v. Beck, 147 N.C. App. 268, 272 n.2, 554
S.E.2d 851, 854 n.2 (2001) (quoting DAVID A. LOGAN & WAYNE A. LOGAN, NORTH
CAROLINA TORTS § 20.30[4] (1996)) ("There is no liability for alienation of affection if
the defendant is ignorant of the existence of the marriage."), overruled on other grounds
by McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 285, 624 S.E.2d 620,625 (2006).
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Criminal conversation is not needed anymore in North
Carolina.133 Two scenarios will always be present in criminal
conversation cases: either a viable alienation of affections claim will
also exist, or the facts giving rise to criminal conversation will fail to
show an intention to tortiously interfere with a marital relationship
(i.e. the defendant did not know the cheating spouse was even
married or the marriage at issue was already broken). In the former
instance, criminal conversation is unnecessarily duplicative.
134
Alienation of affections will suffice. In the latter instance, there is a
serious question whether the defendant should even be liable at all: if
the point of adultery-based torts is to protect marriage from the
wrongful acts of third parties, then it makes little sense to treat
adultery in the same way we treat statutory rape, where only the sex
itself-and nothing else-matters.
Abolishing criminal conversation as I propose would strengthen
adultery-based tort actions in North Carolina because it would put
alienation of affections on a much surer footing. As long as criminal
conversation exists, potential remains for the unfair results it
produces to lead many observers to throw the baby out with the bath
water and conclude that all of the heartbalm torts should be
jettisoned.'35 Moreover, alienation of affections-because of its close
kinship to tortious interference with contracts and loss of
consortium-stands on legal ground that is much more solid than the
shaky footing of criminal conversation. By focusing adultery cases on
the three elements that govern alienation of affections-a happy
marriage, the death of this happy marriage, and attribution of the end
of the marriage to the acts of a malicious stranger-North Carolina
would strike the right balance between substantive adultery that
destroys a family and formalistic adultery that exists in name only.1 36
133. See Batchelor, supra note 19, at 1912 (arguing for abolition of criminal
conversation "because its origins are outdated and irrelevant, it is susceptible to abuse by
blackmail and excessive damages awards, it does not effectively deter marital infidelity,
and it discourages collaborative divorce").
134. See Gray v. Hoover, 94 N.C. App. 724, 731, 381 S.E.2d 472, 476 (1989) (holding
that damages for alienation of affections must be reduced by amount of criminal
conversation damages awarded).
135. The same type of "guilt by association" with the torts of seduction and breach of
marriage promise has long lowered public support for maintaining alienation of affections
and criminal conversation as causes of action. See supra Parts I.B, I.F.
136. Professor Corbett, conversely, proposes a hybrid intentional interference with
marriage tort, the elements of which "would be the existence of a valid marriage,
defendant's knowledge of existence of marriage, and sexual relations between the
defendant and the spouse." See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1054. Although Professor
Corbett's proposal would be an improvement in those states that have abolished the
2012] 2025
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
B. Abolish Iago Liability
lago stands as one of Shakespeare's most diabolical villains. He
is also one of the most unique. In the tragedy Othello, Iago excels at
manipulating people into doing things they otherwise would not do,
ultimately driving Othello to strangle his beloved wife Desdemona. 137
One example of Iago's cunning is this conversation where he slyly
raises doubts about Desdemona's fidelity:
lago: Ha! I like not that.
Othello: What dost thou say?
Iago: Nothing, my lord; or if-I know not what.
Othello: Was not that Cassio parted from my wife?
lago: Cassio, my lord? No, sure, I cannot think it,
That he would steal away so guilty-like,
Seeing your coming.
Othello: I do believe 'twas he. 138
Through exchanges like this one, lago plants seeds of distrust that
shake Othello's faith in his marriage. In tort terms, lago alienates the
affections that Othello has toward his wife.
Should Iago be liable? North Carolina says yes. In Heller v.
Somdahl,139 the North Carolina Court of Appeals faced a claim of a
plaintiff-husband who alleged that defendant, Mary Jones, played the
role of lago and alienated the affections of the plaintiff's wife,
Barbara Heller, by "encouraging" Mrs. Heller, via "intoxication,
coercion, and persuasion,"' to engage in an adulterous relationship
with another man, Russell Somdahl.t 4 Affirming the jury's verdict
against Jones, the court ruled that the evidence supported a finding
that all the elements of alienation of affections had been satisfied.
142
heartbalm torts, this Article argues that alienation of affections better captures the
wrongdoing of third parties upon which tort liability should be based.
137. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 5, sc. 2.
138. Id. at act 3, sc. 3.
139. 206 N.C. App. 313,696 S.E.2d 857 (2010).
140. Id. at 314, 696 S.E.2d at 859-60.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 318, 696 S.E.2d at 862. The court summarized the evidence documenting
Mary Jones' role in the break-up of the Heller marriage as follows:
Plaintiff presented evidence that defendant arrived at the marital home and '[tried] to
drag [Ms. Heller] off.' Defendant called plaintiffs home and told plaintiff that it was
'none of [his] business what his wife did' and that Ms. Heller was 'a grown woman.'
Plaintiff also presented evidence that defendant threatened Ms. Heller. Ms. Heller
testified that 'if I broke Mr. Somdahl's heart, [defendant and defendant's spouse] were
going to break my legs, make sure my children were hurt, [and] my husband would find
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This result is a bridge too far. It is one thing to hold liable in tort
a third party who consummates a sexual affair with someone else's
wife and breaks up that marriage as a result; it is another thing
entirely to attach liability to someone who is not even involved in the
adulterous acts. In both cases, "interference" exists. But, unlike the
sexual interloper, the interference of the meddling interloper typically
"lacks the quality of a moral 'wrong.' "143 This insight is not universal,
as the example of Iago demonstrates. On average, however, friends
and family who meddle into another person's marriage likely do so
out of some selfless concern, even if misguided, about their friend and
family member. Sexual interlopers, conversely, invariably lack this
motive of looking out for the best interests of others. Their
interference is inherently selfish, designed either to fill some
relationship hole in their own lives or to satisfy their own sexual
desires. This focus on self at the expense of an otherwise functioning
relationship makes the interference of the sexual interloper
qualitatively different than the interference of the meddler, and the
law should recognize this distinction.
Moreover, line drawing is a perennial problem in law, no less so
in claims asserting alienation of affections where the vagaries of
causation always persist. One bright line that can help bring stability
and greater certainty to alienation of affections claims seems obvious:
sex. Consider the sister who never approved of her brother's choice in
a spouse. Over the course of the marriage, she never forgets to let her
brother know of her disapproval. After years of ignoring his sister,
one day the brother starts to listen. Divorce follows. Should the sister
be liable to the hated sister-in-law? North Carolina has not foreclosed
the possibility of liability for these Iago-type torts.'" The better view,
out about it.' Ms. Heller testified that defendant prevented plaintiff from talking with Ms.
Heller by '[moving] [her] phone around the house so [Ms. Heller] would get bad
reception.' Ms. Heller testified that Somdahl purchased a ring for her, but defendant took
the ring from Ms. Heller, 'put [it] on... and said [Ms. Heller] wasn't going to get it until
[she] was separated and divorced from [plaintiff].' Evidence also indicated that defendant
'[arranged] all sorts of activities ... to keep [Ms. Heller] away from [her] husband.'
Defendant testified that she allowed Ms. Heller, who she knew did not drink alcohol
responsibly, to attend defendant's party at which alcohol was served.
Id. at 317, 696 S.E.2d at 861.
143. Dobbs, supra note 108, at 344 n.43.
144. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 991 (noting claims "against parents or other close
relatives of the spouse who sought to persuade the spouse to leave the plaintiff or
otherwise interfered in the marriage"). See generally Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 96
S.E.2d 870 (1957) (allowing possibility of alienation of affections claim against father-in-
law although finding that evidence was insufficient in this particular case); Ridenhour v.
Miller, 225 N.C. 543, 35 S.E.2d 611 (1945) (claim against sister-in-law requires showing of
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however, is that liability for alienation of affections should not reach
third parties who do not engage in adulterous relations with the
plaintiff's spouse.145 Otherwise, frank discussions with family and
friends about troubled marriages could flower the seeds of an
alienation of affections complaint. Does the rule that this Article
proposes mean that scoundrels like lago (and perhaps Mary Jones)
sometimes escape liability? Yes, but this happens all the time. The
reality remains that the line of liability must be drawn somewhere,
and sex-or at a minimum, advanced romantic relations-should be
the line. 146
C. Expand the Separation Safe Harbor
In Nunn v. Allen, 147 the plaintiff filed claims for both criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. Complicating the plaintiff's
position was that many of the allegations giving rise to his claims
occurred after he and his wife executed the following separation
agreement:
LIVING SEPARATE: Husband and Wife shall continue to live
separate and apart, each at such place of residence as he or she
may freely choose, free from all interference, authority and
control, direct or indirect, by the other party, as fully as if each
party were unmarried. Neither shall molest the other nor harass
the other, nor compel nor endeavor to compel the other to
cohabit or dwell with him or her.148
The key phrase in this excerpt is the freedom given to the
plaintiff and his wife to live "fully as if each party were unmarried."
Does language such as this protect the defendant from post-
separation liability based on the argument that the plaintiff consented
to any adultery after the signing of the agreement? The North
Carolina Court of Appeals said no, reasoning that post-separation
conduct was relevant to assessing pre-separation conduct and that "a
claim for criminal conversation may be based solely upon post-
malice); Townsend v. Holderby, 197 N.C. 550, 149 S.E. 855 (1929) (discussing standards
for holding in-laws liable for alienation of affections).
145. See Corbett, supra note 34, at 991 (noting discomfort with alienation of affections
liability for" 'mere' persuasion"); Dobbs, supra note 109, at 343 (suggesting that wrongful
conduct is not present in a situation where a person "persuades [his] young nephew to
leave a very bad marriage").
146. But what constitutes "sex?" Where, for example, do "telephone sex" and "cyber
sex" fit? See Corbett, supra note 34, at 1023. This Article leaves these questions for others.
147. 154 N.C. App. 523,574 S.E.2d 35 (2002).
148. Id. at 535, 574 S.E.2d at 43.
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separation sexual relations." '149 The court's decision aligned with
North Carolina precedent on this question. 50
In the 2009 legislation that statutorily recognized alienation of
affections and criminal conversation for the first time, North Carolina
changed the law to better protect defendants faced with post-
separation claims as in Nunn:
No act of the defendant shall give rise to a cause of action for
alienation of affection or criminal conversation that occurs after
the plaintiff and the plaintiff's spouse physically separate with
the intent of either the plaintiff or plaintiff's spouse that the
physical separation remain permanent.' 5'
This provision, while an improvement over Nunn, does not go far
enough to exclude liability for post-separation conduct. The linking of
the post-separation safe harbor to the issue of the intent
accompanying the separation creates questions of fact that will be
difficult to resolve short of a jury trial, forcing affected defendants to
still vigorously defend these types of claims. This result is unfortunate
because the husband and wife's separation is conclusive evidence that
the affections between them have already been alienated before a
third party arrives on the scene post-separation. Further, in terms of
blameworthiness, the defendant who initiates a relationship with the
plaintiff's spouse after the spouse has separated from the plaintiff
stands in a much different position than the defendant in a case like
Hutelmyer. Alienation of affections requires a showing of "wrongful
and malicious acts,""15 and any adultery between the defendant and
the plaintiff's spouse while plaintiff and spouse are living apart would
not seem to rise to this high level. For all these reasons, the better
course would be to create a true safe harbor by adopting a bright-line
rule that post-separation conduct cannot serve as the predicate for
either an alienation of affections or criminal conversation claim.
CONCLUSION
What should courts do when faced with the allegation that a rich,
famous, and beautiful celebrity has "stolen" the affections of another
149. Id. (citing Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C. App. 199, 557 S.E.2d 189 (2001)).
150. See Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938) (noting that the
"mere fact of separation does not preclude an action for criminal conversation"); Johnson,
148 N.C. App. at 200, 557 S.E.2d at 191 (same).
151. Act of Aug. 3, 2009, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 780, 780 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-13 (2011).
152. Heller v. Somdahl, 206 N.C. App. 313, 315,696 S.E.2d 857,860 (2010).
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person's spouse? Back to Fantasia. Assume the allegations to be true.
Should Fantasia be held accountable in tort? Or does legal
responsibility-in tort terms, proximate cause-rest solely with
Antwaun Cook for leaving the marital bed on his own volition?
Proximate cause "is sometimes said to depend on whether the
conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the
defendant should be legally responsible." '153 This determination is
notoriously elusive as "both significance and importance turn upon
conclusions in terms of legal policy, so that they depend essentially on
whether the policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the
conduct to the consequences which have in fact occurred." '154 Even if
Fantasia's actions were a but-for cause in the breakup of the Cook
marriage, it does not necessarily follow that her actions constituted a
legal cause upon which liability could be based. The test in alienation
of affection cases is whether "the wrongful acts of the defendant were
the controlling or effective cause of the alienation, even though there
were other causes, which might have contributed to the alienation."'55
For critics of the heartbalm torts such as Professor Feinsinger, such a
standard remains woefully insufficient:
[J]uries can scarcely be expected to proceed on any objective
basis to distinguish the pursuer from the pursued. Frequently
the marital relationship has previously been openly disrupted,
and it is safe to assume that in most cases internal disintegration
has already commenced when defendant appears on the scene.
An expert social scientist would scarcely undertake to designate
any one cause of disorganization as "controlling" in a given
case, yet the law confidently relies on the jury to make such a
selection. 156
Professor Feinsinger, however, wrote from the perspective of the
1930s when tort law was much different. Professor Corbett, supplying
a contemporary viewpoint, is surely correct when he notes: "In the
difficult causation and allocation of fault issues they may present, [the
heartbalm] torts are no different from many others that modern tort
law does recognize." '157
Recognizing this close fit between alienation of affections and
other areas of tort described by Professor Corbett paves the way for
153. KEETON ET AL.,supra note 38, at 273.
154. Id.
155. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 364, 369, 514 S.E.2d 554, 559 (1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
156. Feinsinger, supra note 4, at 995.
157. Corbett, supra note 34, at 1021.
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rehabilitating adultery-based torts in the eyes of the legal community.
Third-party adulterous interference with a functioning marriage is at
least as great a wrong as third-party interference with contractual
relations or prospective business relations. The same causation issues
inherent in analyzing the unique dynamics of any relationship are also
present in both sets of torts. Similarly, intentionally disrupting the
bonds of consortium between a married couple is at least as great a
wrong as negligently disrupting those bonds. The law's inconsistent
treatment of these different situations makes little conceptual sense,
especially in modern times when tort liability has continually
expanded to afford greater relief for those injured by the wrongful
acts of another. Juries routinely make the type of judgment calls
about which Professor Feinsinger warned in the 1930s. While
alienation of affections is regularly derided as a legal outlier, this
characterization is more reputation than reality. Adultery as tort is
not out-of-step with American law; rather, it is the treatment of
alienation of affections by most states that is out of step with the rest
of tort law.
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